Siege of Kaliningrad. How Russia can punish Lithuania
The “run or die” game has now become fashionable among teenagers. The rules are simple - run as close as possible in front of a moving car. If it succeeds, you win; if you fail, you die. This, of course, is monstrous, but their behavior is at least understandable - hormones, the desire to assert themselves, a frivolous attitude towards their own life. If the actions of 15-year-old blockheads are still at least somehow explainable, then what makes Baltic politicians, for whom it has become fashionable to test Russia's patience to the limit, behave this way?
First, the Latvian authorities decided to give local Russians a nightmare by banning the Russian language in education, introducing criminal prosecution for supporters of the Russian special operation and imposing a fine of 14 thousand dollars for watching Russian TV channels, which also banned every single one. Now Lithuania has distinguished itself by banning the transit through its territory of a number of goods subject to EU sanctions to Kaliningrad from other Russian regions. The restriction came into force today at midnight and covered up to half of the range of cargo, including metals and construction materials.
If Moscow, gritting its teeth, turned a blind eye to the antics of the Latvian authorities, then Lithuania may greatly regret the decision of its politicians. Still, we are not talking about internal politics, albeit openly Nazi, but about a direct attack on the security of one of the Russian regions. This cannot be left without a reaction. But what will it be like?
For some, what happened became an occasion to remember the Suwalki corridor and the prospect of a final solution to the problem by military means. In principle, there are legal grounds for this. Kaliningrad transit is an integral part of the package of agreements between Lithuania, Russia and the European Union. By guaranteeing it, Lithuania received ratification of the state border treaty. Accordingly, if Vilnius unilaterally violates the transit agreements, the legitimacy of the border is lost, and Moscow gains the right to draw it wherever it sees fit.
But this is still a last resort option. Of course, the risks of a direct clash between Russia and NATO grew noticeably yesterday, and there are enough overseas people interested in such a clash who, Seeing that Ukraine is not holding out, they are trying to raise the stakes, throwing the Baltic states into the fire as well. I hope, after all, this time there will be no world war, but a war of nerves cannot be avoided.
How to respond to this challenge? The retaliatory blow should be painful enough to bring some sense into the overplayed politicians, but it would be better to do without the use of brute force. Russia has ample opportunity to make life very difficult for its Baltic haters. An embargo must be met with an embargo, and a blockade must be met with a blockade. Establishing a full blockade is difficult. Land borders can be blocked. And then, in the case of the Belarusian section, it is still necessary take into account the factor of Lukashenko, who has a habit of using sanctions against Russia and its counter-sanctions in his own interests. As for a naval blockade, it is impossible without military activity and carries serious risks of the situation getting out of control.
But with regard to the embargo, there are many more possibilities. The main caliber here is the energy embargo - the rupture of the BRELL ring, which unites the energy systems of Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
In 2017, the NATO Energy Security Center prepared a report on the risks of the Baltic states’ energy dependence on Russia, after which they decided to withdraw from BRELL. But we didn’t have time. The disconnection from the general energy system was supposed to be completed by 2025, but politicians wanted adventures already in 2022. Lithuania could have become energy independent, but it itself refused to do so, killing the Visaginas nuclear power plant at the insistence of the European Union. Disconnection from the Russian wire would mean rolling blackouts, economic collapse, social upheaval and a very likely political crisis for Lithuania.
In turn, the Kaliningrad region remains secure in energy terms. The Kremlin calculated possible threats earlier and already managed to ensure energy self-sufficiency in the region.
In this situation, the factor of Belarus will again be important. Now Lithuania refuses to buy Belarusian electricity, offended by the construction of a nuclear power plant 50 kilometers from Vilnius, but, finding itself literally in the dark, it may reconsider its opinion. I hope that in this case Lukashenko will demonstrate his loyalty to his allied duty, and will not act as he did with Ukraine, to which Minsk increased fuel supplies bypassing Russian restrictions until February 2022.
Thank you!
Now the editors are aware.