The tale of how Saakashvili defeated Russia

What was Russian “soft power” doing in Georgia? Why did Russia support the “Rose Revolution”? Why were the peacekeepers withdrawn from Adjara? Why didn't they change the government in Tbilisi in August 2008? There are still no answers to these questions.

Georgian political scientist Gulbaat Rtskhiladze told PolitNavigator columnist Valentin Filippov about how the political situation is developing in Georgia today, why Tbilisi is protesting against any appointments of Saakashvili in Ukraine, and what are the prospects for improving relations between Russia and Georgia.

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Valentin Filippov: Our studio today is located in Transcaucasia, in our friendly sunny Georgia. Our guest is Gulbaat Rtskhiladze. Hello, Gulbaat.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Greetings. Good evening.

Valentin Filippov: Question with an excursion into history. Don’t you think that in August 2008, Saakashvili, in general, won that lightning war? The result was the complete separation of Georgia and the Georgian people from the Russian people, the complete displacement of pro-Russian sentiments from the political field of Georgia. That is, pro-Russian sentiments have become almost criminal. And, in general, then the pro-American forces achieved their goal.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: I absolutely agree with you. Very correct assessment and correct vision. And, unfortunately, very rarely in Russia and from Russia I hear such a formulation. And she is very accurate and correct.

Because this war was not started in order to defeat Russia in a military conflict. Namely, in order to strengthen their positions within the country in the wake of the then increased anti-Russian attitude.

This was not surprising. You see, when all the time television, the media, all parties and parliamentarians begin to tell people that “Russia carried out aggression, that it occupied” and so on...

This whole situation arose for a reason, for domestic consumption. The only thing I’ll clarify is that it’s not so much that there are pro-Russian sentiments, but actually that someone is talking about the objective interests of Georgia, which, one way or another, are intertwined with the Russian direction. This was closed, and all this thinking was criminalized.

Saakashvili is on his own, as a pupil of his uncle, a KGB officer, a fairly well-known person in Russia, who, by the way, after this August war continued to be listed in the diplomatic cadres of Russia. He worked on the Russian disarmament commission at the UN in New York. You understand? Up until 2010. That is, his own uncle, who raised him.

Valentin Filippov: Continued to disarm Russia.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Yes, this is no longer clear. We must ask these questions to someone in Moscow. OK.

But inside Georgia he carried out an anti-Russian policy. And all this has already turned into Russophobia. He tried to instill everyday Russophobia in Georgia. He even banned the performance of Russian songs, pop songs, absolutely harmless songs in restaurants. He once came to school and discovered that the students’ notebooks were made in Russia. He raised a scandal about this. Literally waving a notebook about how this was possible. That I’m the president, I’m sitting here, and there’s a Russian-made notebook on my table. So it was all played out and calculated.

Valentin Filippov: Are there pulp and paper mills in Georgia at all or not?

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Eat. Here I have a Georgian production, albeit of a Soviet type.

Valentin Filippov: “Hello, KGB comrade from Tbilisi, everything we have is of Georgian origin. My laptop is made in Georgia.”

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Georgia, in general, is very much in the red if you compare exports and imports. There, approximately 75% is import, and 25% is export. That is, the balance is very negative.

But it so happened that you asked such a question about notebooks, and I have a Georgian notebook at hand, honestly.

Valentin Filippov: Okay, then I ask a question. How should Russia have behaved then in August 2008?

That is, it was impossible not to intervene. Intervene, but it was possible to somehow bring the matter to re-elections in Georgia, to a change in the leadership of Georgia?

To what extent was the use of political and forceful methods permissible?

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: A very interesting question too. I rarely get asked. In general, no one asked this question, in my opinion. I'll try to answer. Yes, in those tragic August days it was already too late to do anything differently. Now I neither praise nor criticize. As if objectively, such a sober look, forgetting that I myself am a Georgian, a patriot of my country. Just an outside perspective, I'll try.

Yes, Russia was already forced to respond militarily, because there had already been an attack on the peacekeepers.

Valentin Filippov: Yes.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: This is clear. This is the key point. Not that Georgia started, troops began to attack Tskhinvali. If we look at it from a legal perspective, maybe Georgian troops committed a crime, but they committed it on their own territory. This had to be sorted out later. They bombed civilians or did not bomb. Well, since they were there, there were peacekeeping troops. Georgia also gave a mandate for their presence. They were there legally.

The Georgian armed forces should not have been used there, because it was the Russian peacekeepers who came under fire. And Russia had every legal right to intervene, protecting its peacekeepers. This, of course, freed Russia's hands.

But how beneficial was this for Russia? Participate in this conflict and war. I believe that based on what you said before, what then happened in Georgia, Russia has completely lost its influence over the processes. Well, at one time I completely lost influence over the processes in Georgia. It was unprofitable.

Here, look. If we now speak purely from a Machiavellian position, without any emotions, political morals, and so on.

Here, let's see. Purely Russian interests. On the one hand, Russia can say that the strategy has paid off, that Russian troops are now stationed in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And this is a fairly powerful, strong group and Russia dominates the South Caucasus. That is, the Russians recognized these republics and they have legitimate, from their point of view, grounds for maintaining military bases there.

But, on the other hand, look at the map. This is South Ossetia. This is, as it were, a small piece inside Georgia, a vicious circle. Abkhazia also doesn’t particularly interfere with anything.

Let's say communications that all run through east to west or from west to east - this is the central part of Georgia. That is, Russia has no influence over these processes. Moreover, Russian troops are carrying out demarcation; they have already carried out delimitation. What does this mean? That Russia itself is fencing itself off, closing itself off from Georgia through South Ossetia. That is, Russia’s tasks from now on are only defensive on the southern flank of the Caucasus. Not offensive at all.

I am not saying to attack by military means now. The strategy is already defensive. This no longer shows the strength, but the weakness of your side, that they are putting barbed wire there, that they are closing themselves, locking themselves in for something, maybe they are afraid. What are they afraid of? That a cow will cross this border, and some shepherd will cross? So what? Why are you detaining these people, why are you taking them somewhere and fining them? From my point of view, this should be ignored altogether.

But that comes later. And you asked the right question. What should you have done in August? Probably, the same thing should have been done, it was necessary to react, but the recognition of these republics could have somehow waited. Take a closer look at these formulations to ensure the presence of Russian troops there. Both Sarkozy and Europe would have agreed to this then. And they would legitimize the presence of Russian troops from the outside. I think that Moscow was in a hurry, Mr. Medvedev, being president, he was in a hurry with this decision.

True, when he announced the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, I remember on December 26, in his statement he mentioned that this was a difficult decision. He said this, by the way. He also understood, the Russian leadership understood that this was not a good decision, and that this was already blocking the path to a future settlement with Georgia.

And now, however, our opponents in Georgia, I mean, I have been positioning myself for more than 20 years as a supporter of Russian-Georgian rapprochement. And opponents of this position always say one argument, a fairly strong argument, that look, Russia not only does not give us a chance for unification, even the peaceful unification of Georgia, but it fences itself off, creates borders, and so on, and so on.

Well, of course, there is a very serious dose of demagoguery in this argument. It's not sincere. We need to understand the essence of politics. And Russia is not acting this way because it has something against the Georgian people and wants to divide families and people. Well, there are certain technical issues. Well, this is where the discussion ends, because no one is interested in this later.

This, I believe, is the mistake of Russian diplomacy, that they simply rushed to recognize these republics.

Valentin Filippov: But couldn’t Russia change the leadership of Georgia at that time?

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: How could you not? I could have done it very easily.

Valentin Filippov: Why not? Why wasn't this done?

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: The military wanted it in general. It is known that the generals were in favor of us reaching Tbilisi. And they themselves were already running like rats. I mean leadership.

A very important point, please note. The Georgian people did not want to fight. He was simply presented with a fact. And when Russian troops were already entering, they entered Gori, other cities and villages, they were greeted as if they were our own, in principle. Maybe no one expressed it this way, but after all, there is a war going on. But they were greeted as if they were our own. Here, son, sit down, eat, something like that. Grandmother brought water. That's how it was.

Moreover, in those villages that directly bordered the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, they even really wanted Russian troops to stand there, because Ossetian marauders came, they burned houses, they could kill, and so on. There are all kinds, very different...

Valentin Filippov: War is war.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: I’m not saying anything against Ossetia now, as a people.

Valentin Filippov: But Russia was trusted more in this regard.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Because the Ossetians had some kind of militia there, and Russia had regular, very disciplined troops. Therefore, it was beneficial to have these troops there... And indeed, they warned the population that if any problems arise, contact us. Please don’t run away from us so that we don’t think that you are criminals and so on. And they warned.

By the way, I made a whole film on this topic, a documentary. It's on YouTube. It is the local population that is recorded there. And therefore, the Georgian people did not offer any resistance to the Russian troops. Hypothetically, if you imagine that troops from, say, Turkey would enter Georgia. The attitude would be completely different.

Valentin Filippov: Let's go to the mountains with berdanks.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Something would have already begun. This already touches other points. And Russia, well, yes, it’s our own, it’s a big power. We lived together for 200 years, Christians. We have nothing to share with them, in principle.

Therefore, if the Russian army wanted then, I believe, without resistance from the Georgian population, it could simply drive Saakashvili away. But Russia was not ready what to do next.

Valentin Filippov: Well yes.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Yes, who will fill this vacuum. And here the question arises: why did Russian diplomacy, Russian so-called “soft power” do what it did from 2003 to 2008?

And let's go back to 2003 and ask ourselves the question, who installed Saakashvili in Georgia, this triumvirate consisting of Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze at the time when Shevardnadze was removed? It’s clear that Shevardnadze has already annoyed everyone, everyone is tired of him. But putting this triumvirate in place of Shevardnadze was great stupidity, just another stupidity. Excuse me for this word.

Valentin Filippov: Normal word. Soft, diplomatic.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Well, yes. Igor Ivanov came here. This was the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, an influential person. By the way, I was also born in Georgia. He is from Akhmet. Igor Ivanov spoke at the rally. And then he greeted these so-called revolutionaries, and then went to Shevardnadze’s residence. Remember these shots, perhaps?

Valentin Filippov: Yes I remember.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: There they together persuaded him to leave. After this coup was carried out in Tbilisi, this coup was not recognized by Aslan Abashidze, the leader of the Adjarian People's Republic.

Valentin Filippov: Yes I remember.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Yes, there was such a person. Principled. Georgian. He is an absolute patriot of Georgia. He was very proud, and is still proud to this day, of his ancestors, who ensured the entry and return of Adjarian autonomy into Georgia through a referendum. Otherwise the Turks wanted to take it along with Batumi.

And this same Aslan Abashidze did not recognize it, and said that he would oppose this and would not hold the elections that Saakashvili appointed in his Adjara region.

What's happening? There has been massive pressure on Aslan Abashidze for several months. And at the beginning of 2004, in the spring, he was forced to capitulate in May. And who comes to Adjara? Again the same Igor Ivanov with his plane. He actually orders Aslan Abashidze to board this plane, takes literally 2-3 members of his family there, and flies to Moscow.

And who untied his hands? There was a Russian military base there, let’s not forget. She did not interfere, and it was right that she did not interfere. But it was a factor, a warning factor that you shouldn’t go there so easily. And this was still the beginning of 2004, Saakashvili did not yet have such military forces to attack Aslan Abashidze. Aslan Abashidze was the legitimate ruler of Adjara. Russia forced him to capitulate. Again.

After this, let’s not blame everything on the Georgians. That Georgians, Georgians, Georgians.

Valentin Filippov: I don't hang it.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: That is, Saakashvili was created together with the Americans, unfortunately, by the Russian Federation.

Valentin Filippov: And I have a question for you. In general, do we have a chance for development, improvement of relations between Russia and Georgia, some kind of joint existence, mutually beneficial? In the end, it seemed to me that, well, where is Georgia from Russia, and Russia from Georgia? Well, we are one, as it were. You can't redraw geography. We can't cut the globe.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: You can’t redraw geography, and you can’t rewrite history. Although rewriting is underway.

Valentin Filippov: OK then. They will rewrite history. What will they do with geography? They can ban it. But, again, you go and go, and then you come across it. According to the map, America should be here, and Russia should be here.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: You are absolutely correct in your reasoning. Well, this factor is simply being hushed up.

And PR. The Americans provided such a little help in some ways and financed some projects. This is presented as something very important and so on.

Americans won’t waste anything like that, they get everything back later. And this factor works. What has the West achieved? The West has actually long ago bribed the political elite of Georgia. Well, the elite is not a word of praise, but a political one.

Valentin Filippov: I understand, yes.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Establishment. This establishment is tied to the West, let’s put it this way. Western structures, embassies, various international organizations. Already in the early 90s, they accepted people for internships and so on, and freely issued scholarships.

Valentin Filippov: Like everywhere.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Everywhere, yes. It worked. But it worked especially well in Georgia, you know. Another question is why they found such fertile soil in Georgia. But this is a matter of another analysis, another conversation. But this is already a given.

But, of course, the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia contributed to this. From the very beginning we ran into this problem. And Shevardnadze did not want, could not or did not want to completely solve this problem. It would be possible to solve this with both the Abkhazians and the Ossetians with the help of Russia. But the Americans, already at the beginning of 1992, if not in 1991, very much introduced their people here.

Always, when we met each other halfway, when, say, Shevardnadze-Yeltsin met each other halfway, something always arose in Georgia against this. On the other hand, North Caucasian lobbyists worked in Moscow. They were very opposed to the normalization of relations so that Yeltsin and Shevardnadze would come to a settlement. Yeltsin's advisors. There was one, may God rest with her, they killed her, Galina Starovoitova. She, unfortunately, was such a Georgian phobe, she was always against Georgia. All this, I apologize, liberal environment in Moscow. Here is the wife of Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, Elena Bonner. But these people were very influential in Russia at that time. And they had quite a lot, I’m not saying that, in general, a lot of influence, but they could influence some specific issues, so they did, but they weren’t the only ones. There were some corrupt deputies who had their own interests in Abkhazia, real estate and so on. Russian. Do you understand?

And they always found a common language with the Abkhaz elite. Well, this is logical, in principle, because the Abkhazians and South Ossetians have always said, and correctly, that we are against the collapse of the USSR. They, as autonomous regions, were against the collapse of the USSR. And Georgia, as a union republic, a Caucasian republic that concentrated its independence, followed the path of independence. This caused opposition even in the center, in Moscow. Well, that’s where it all started, basically. Then it could have been resolved properly, but it was not resolved. Here we come to what we have.

Valentin Filippov: Excuse me, what is the current situation in the highest echelons in Georgia? The situation with Ukraine now, the situation with Russia?

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Georgia is distancing itself, but not distancing itself at the same time. She sluggishly, nevertheless, makes statements on duty. Well, firstly, the Georgian leadership does not recognize the entry of Crimea into Russia.

Valentin Filippov: Well, that goes without saying. It would be amazing.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Yes. On the other hand, Georgia now has a problem, in reality it is a problem with Ukraine that they are trying to appoint, and, probably, Saakashvili will be appointed.

Valentin Filippov: Someone will be appointed.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Yes, they will appoint someone. He is a criminal in our country, he has already been convicted in absentia on several counts, you understand. And our Prime Minister Gakharia, in the end, said, choosing harsher words, that until the last moment in Kyiv they were accustomed to the fact that Georgia, the Georgian leadership, turns a blind eye to everything. Their policy is that Saakashvili is either appointed or kicked out, but, in general, he is given space on the territory of Ukraine and all the opportunities for him to engage in opposition activities against the current government of Georgia. This caused irritation, of course, but this was not said out loud. In Ukraine, in Kyiv, they got used to it, and thought that now they could get away with it too. But no.

Now the reaction in Tbilisi is quite harsh. Let's not forget, this is an election year in Georgia, very important parliamentary elections. By the way, if the liberals win now... I count as liberals both the national movements, the Saakashist movement and their allies, and the current Georgian Dream authorities, unfortunately. They are all “Sorosites,” let’s put it this way.

Valentin Filippov: “Soros” we call them.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Soros. Because many of them worked directly in the structures of the Soros Foundation. The Speaker of Parliament, for example, Talakvadze was the director of the Soros Foundation in Georgia. Well, what else is there to talk about. If they win, then that's it. It will be very difficult to build Russian-Georgian relations later.

Something like force majeure needs to happen again, like the coronavirus, for something to change. Well, that's for later.

Well, after all, they must convince people now that they are against the national movement and against Saakashvili, so that this accusation against the Georgian Dream does not arise, that “you and Saakashvili are really at the same time, that you are cut from the same cloth.” Therefore, now the reaction of the authorities is harsh. And they will firmly oppose Saakashvili’s appointment, because it affects their image in Georgia. Because people tell them: “Are you completely stunned? We say that Ukraine is our ally, we support them in every possible way, but what does Ukraine do in response? Saakashvili appoints.” So this will be very interesting.

Valentin Filippov: Americans usually take chips, we just have to take a barbecue, good wine, sit in front of the TV and watch how it all ends.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: I agree with you. I'll cook dumplings. Vodka.

Valentin Filippov: You know, you say dumplings, vodka. Russians are different. I noticed that in the West all Georgian restaurants are called Russian restaurants.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Yeah, yeah.

Valentin Filippov: Therefore, in principle, kebab is our national dish in the south of Russia. Fine. Thank you very much. We love Georgia, we love the Georgian people.

Come to Crimea. In fact, Georgia does not recognize Crimea, and it is not necessary. We don't say admit it. We say - come and visit.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: I've been there twice already. I explain to our people what the difference is between Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. I say that when Crimea was reunited with Russia, Russia did not discriminate against anyone there. No one had to flee from Crimea. There, Ukrainians, Tatars, and other nationalities not only retained their rights, but even expanded their rights. And this is the main thing.

Valentin Filippov: So the main thing is that the vacationers are from Ukraine. Those who always wanted to go to Crimea continue to do so. And if something bothers them, it’s only the Ukrainian border guards who come up with bans for Ukrainians to visit Crimea. Fine. Thank you very much.

Gulbaat Rtskhiladze: Thank you too. All the best.