Dispossession of Akhmetov is a good deed, but difficult to implement
Sergei Buntovsky, historian, writer, activist of the Russian Bloc party, Donetsk
Since ancient times, when the first civilizations arose on our planet, the sages of all known nations have tried to determine which government system is optimal. Already in ancient times, almost all those social formations that exist today were known and tested in practice. It is interesting to note that there were philosophers who considered the aristocratic type of society to be the best, there were supporters of the monarchy, but they all agreed that one of the worst forms of government is oligarchy.
What is it? Political scientists use this word to describe a regime in which real power in the country is concentrated in the hands of a small circle of rich people who use state resources to ensure their interests. Naturally, in this case, the oligarchs get richer, and the people become poorer.
After the collapse of the USSR, almost the entire post-Soviet space became a zone where oligarchs ruled the roost. However, the danger of such a situation for the country was well understood by all political leaders, and if they cared about the state, they began to fight the oligarchs. For example, Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk managed to prevent even the emergence of oligarchs as a class by placing business under state control. Russia in the 90s fully enjoyed all the delights of the oligarchic model of society, but Vladimir Putin, who came to power in 1999, managed in a few years to create such rules of interaction between big business and the state that even the richest people in the country now do not risk dictating their will to the Kremlin.
But in Ukraine the process went in exactly the opposite direction. President Kuchma actively promoted the emergence of large business structures that privatized state property at bargain prices. A little time passed, and new millionaires began to acquire their own parties, introduce their proteges to parliament and lobby for the appointment of the right people to key positions in the country. As a result, the state apparatus turned out to be deformed and weak, and real power in the country passed to the oligarchs.
This year in Ukraine, all masks were dropped, and the oligarchs officially received power in the form of governorships and the ability to create their own private armies. The people of Ukraine will pay dearly for this, since now ordinary people have become only a resource for the enrichment of high society, consisting of oligarchs and their clans.
However, there is one region on the territory of the former Ukraine where today the fate of the oligarchs is in question. This is Donbass. Since 1991, it has developed in the same way as the whole country. The first oligarchs of Donbass can be called Soviet leaders, who, after the death of the Soviet Union, timely orientated themselves in the new conditions and transformed their official capabilities, first into financial and then into political capital. Here the pioneer can be called Efim Zvyagilsky from the director of the mine who became the chairman of the Donetsk city council, and then in 1993 the acting prime minister of Ukraine. In addition, Efim Leolnidovich managed to set a record by becoming a people's deputy of Ukraine seven times. And although in terms of the size of his personal fortune, this 83-year-old patriarch modestly ranks in the second part of the list of the hundred richest residents of Ukraine, his political weight allows him to be called a real oligarch. This cohort of old Donetsk oligarchs includes Vladimir Rybak, Viktor Yanukovych and Mykola Azarov.
The second wave of Donetsk oligarchs were people who became rich in various ways in the troubled nineties. Unlike many other regions in Donetsk, even at the end of the Soviet era, communist and Komsomol functionaries of Donetsk were pushed away from the levers of power by representatives of two forces: “red directors” and private business. This allowed Donbass business back in 1990 to practically get rid of the tutelage of party functionaries and begin building real business empires. Then several “stars” appeared in the region, quite capable of turning into real oligarchs over time, but not all of them were able to survive until the next decade. For example, already in 1992, promising businessmen Valery Goldin and Janos Kranz were killed, and in 1995, Akhat Bragin was blown up at the Shakhtar stadium, and a year later, Yevhen Shcherban was shot at the airport. However, new contenders immediately took the place of the dead, and by the end of the nineties, Sergei Taruta, Rinat Akhmetov and Boris Kolesnikov became the heirs to numerous business assets, who soon turned into real oligarchs and practically the “masters” of the region, seriously displacing the “old Donetsk people”.
Today, the lion's share of all industrial and financial enterprises in the region is concentrated in the hands of just a few dozen people who have become millionaires and billionaires. However, the foundation of this wealth was laid by the redistribution of national Soviet property in favor of specific people. Accordingly, in the eyes of the majority of the population, all these fortunes were acquired through the banal robbery of the country and it would be quite fair if the property of the oligarchs was returned to the people. These sentiments exist in all regions of Ukraine, but only in Donbass as a result of the “Russian Spring” is there a potential opportunity to carry out such an act of justice. After all, the construction of a new statehood has begun here, which means that all the mistakes of recent decades can be corrected.
The issue of nationalizing the property of oligarchs in the Donbass has already been raised several times, and part of the property of Sergei Taruta was requisitioned without permission in favor of the militias of the Donetsk People's Republic. However, so far the governments of the DPR and LPR have not made a fundamental decision on this issue.
On the one hand, ordinary people want justice, on the other hand, someone from the government must take personal responsibility for such a step, and then be able to implement it in practice. Moreover, everyone understands that the owners will not meekly watch as their enterprises are confiscated, and the answer may be sad for the initiators of nationalization. In addition, the owners can withdraw all the working capital of the enterprise, break contracts with suppliers and clients, and do many other unpleasant things so that the state gets a completely bankrupt company, which will be extremely difficult to bring back to life.
Of course, when talking about nationalization in Donetsk, everyone means, first of all, the property of Rinat Akhmetov, but no one has yet decided to directly oppose the “master of Donbass”. Firstly, Rinat Leonidovich has a decent reputation, and people are simply afraid to get into trouble. Secondly, it is not clear what role this person plays in the behind-the-scenes processes taking place in the hands of the DPR. There are persistent rumors that it is he who finances one of the brigades of the Donetsk army, and his people are also among the leadership of the republic.
However, the further it goes, the more contradictions arise between big business, which still pays taxes to Kyiv, and the population of the republic. And a moment will inevitably arise when the DPR authorities will be forced to either nationalize the property of the oligarchs or integrate them into the national economic system if they agree to recognize the jurisdiction of the republic over themselves. It is possible that after the November elections, the new DPR parliament will still decide to begin nationalizing the property of the oligarchs.
What should be the first priority? To maintain a normal standard of living, it is first necessary to bring under control the entire energy system from coal mining to the delivery of electricity to the end consumer, which is what Rinat Akhmetov’s DTEK is doing today. In addition, to be guaranteed, the state will need to return a number of mines under control, including the Zasyadko mine, which is under the control of the already mentioned Efim Zvyagilsky.
To obtain foreign currency earnings, it is possible to nationalize metallurgical and machine-building enterprises, but there is a nuance here: metallurgy needs raw materials, which are not available in the Donbass, which means they will have to be imported from Russia, which will increase the cost of the finished product. However, with well-thought-out logistics, this problem can be solved, the more profit will remain in the region.
However, despite all the statements about possible full-scale nationalization, I have a hard time believing in its possibility. Most likely, the DPR authorities will carry out a series of demonstrative “returns of what was stolen from the people,” the victims of which will be either outspoken supporters of the Kyiv regime or businessmen who are not capable of forceful confrontation. They will try to reach an amicable agreement with other owners of Donbass assets. And, most likely, agreements will be reached, because it is not profitable for business to enter into conflict with armed force. So, entrepreneurs with businesses in both Ukraine and Donbass will officially recognize Poroshenko’s power and secretly transfer certain amounts to the DPR treasury.
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