How real is the military conflict between Ukraine and Transnistria?
At the beginning of August, the press actively discussed an allegedly impending attack from Transnistria on Ukraine. When we talk about the possibility of such an invasion, they usually compare the number of residents of Transnistria (500 thousand people, of which no more than 300-350 thousand are constantly at home) and the number of residents of Ukraine (more than 40 million people). Then the conversation usually ends. But, taking into account the escalating situation in our region, let’s try to conduct a “cold” analysis of the current opportunities and reasons for any conflict between the two peoples.
When someone talks about a military invasion, they mean achieving some political goals through military means. What political goals can Transnistria pursue on the territory of Ukraine? The analysis shows that Transnistria does not have any depth and breadth, and in the foreseeable future there will not be any political goals that would need to be resolved by seizing the territory of Ukraine.
Further, if we abstract from the search for a political goal of aggressive actions, for any political action, including war, it is necessary to have the resources to take such an action. In particular, in the case we are considering, this is the size of the army, the possibilities of its logistical support, the motivation of military personnel and citizens of the belligerent side.
According to Soviet standards, the number of attacking troops should be in proportion to the defending side in a ratio of 3: 1 (NATO standard is even higher). We take air supremacy out of the scope of analysis, since it seems that both sides today on this issue are already at the same level - the lack of aviation.
Transnistria has never set itself the task of ensuring such a ratio of armed forces with any of the neighboring states. Even if we hypothetically assume that in a certain area it would be possible to form such a balance of forces for a certain period of time, this would be a suicidal decision, since such a group would literally have nothing to supply in a matter of days. You need to understand that Pridnestrovie carries out its supply of fuels and lubricants, food, and medicines through transit through the territories of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Those. any aggressive actions of Transnistria are stopped by a banal cessation of the transit of goods vital to the republic, which leaves the army without logistical support.
A tactical breakthrough in a separate sector is suicidal because it is very quickly eliminated either by flank attacks or simply by an attack on Transnistria from the Republic of Moldova, which in this case will be completely exposed.
Next, we should dwell on the motives that could force Pridnestrovian citizens to participate in such an adventure. Here it very quickly becomes clear that, strictly speaking, there is nothing to stop at, there are no motives and never have been. In such serious matters as the existence of their own statehood, good neighborly relations with fraternal peoples, the citizens of Transnistria somehow do not particularly trust the political leadership. As the events in the MSSR of the early 90s showed, if the government follows its own path, different from the interests of the people who elected it, then in Transnistria the levers of direct expression of the will of the people are turned on. Neither the war with the people of the Republic of Moldova, nor the war with the people of Ukraine is in the interests of the people of Transnistria, therefore, no politician can do anything to force the Transnistrians to attack any of their neighbors.
Two cases of mobilization that took place in the history of Transnistria more than eloquently reveal the topic of the motivation of Pridnestrovians for armed struggle. The first case was the beginning of the 90s, when the people rose up in response to the aggression unleashed by the Romanian authorities of the Republic of Moldova. The second attempt was made by the leadership of the republic in the mid-XNUMXs, when the first “school crisis” broke out. This attempt was unsuccessful, since the Transnistrians simply had no motive to use armed methods of struggle.
The leadership of the republic is well aware of the fundamental impossibility of an aggressive policy directed against its neighbors. That is why all the exercises of the armed forces of the republic are aimed at developing exclusively defensive skills. Information about all training sessions of the PMR Armed Forces is publicly available on the Internet, on the official websites of Pridnestrovie.
No maneuvers involving the mobilization and concentration of troops in any direction have been and are not carried out in Transnistria. At the same time, we see the development of skills in defensive actions, both of the armed forces and other paramilitary forces of Transnistria. All of the above can be attributed to an even greater extent to the limited contingent of the Russian armed forces located in Transnistria.
Recently, the scenario of the absorption of Transnistria by the alliance of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova has also been discussed. Let us dwell on this thesis, abstracting from its authorship.
All political ideas, in our opinion, must pass the test of compliance with the interests of their own citizens and their own state. Let’s put ourselves on the side of Kyiv politicians and try to answer the following questions: how the situation on its southwestern borders will change for Ukraine in the event of the liquidation of the statehood of Transnistria, what methods can be used to achieve the liquidation of the statehood of Transnistria and what resources are needed for this.
So, let’s assume that Ukraine helped the authorities of the Republic of Moldova absorb Transnistria. In this case, a monolithic and aggressive alliance of Romania and the Republic of Moldova will soon appear on the southwestern border of Ukraine, and it is possible that simply a united Romania. An alliance that has territorial claims to Ukraine. And not only claims, but also resources - both diplomatic and military - to satisfy their claims.
The Romanian state has repeatedly demonstrated its desire and ability to use these resources, both in 1918 and 1941, when military methods were used to resolve territorial disputes, and in 2009, when the dispute between Romania and Ukraine was resolved within the walls of the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Therefore, Ukraine in the near future will be vitally interested in the existence of Transnistria in one form or another as an element of containing Romanian expansion.
In addition, if such a scenario is realized, Ukraine will have another serious point of disagreement in relations with the Russian Federation; it will most likely lose the sales market for its goods sold in Transnistria, and the ports of Ukraine will lose the trade flows generated by Transnistria, which will reoriented to Giurgiulesti and Romanian ports.
In addition, sooner or later (in the interests of the people of Ukraine it would be better to do it quickly), Ukraine will have to look for ways to escape from direct, strict subordination to the American authorities. In this case, the Transnistria factor can also serve as a political argument for a “polite refusal” to implement any “recommendations” of the State Department.
Thus, Ukraine does not gain either political or economic benefits from actions related to the liquidation of Transnistrian statehood. On the contrary, with such actions it creates for itself or aggravates very serious and very real foreign and domestic political problems.
Next, there is the question of what methods can be used to eliminate the statehood of Transnistria. This raises the question of either a blockade of the transit of goods and people through the territory of Ukraine, or a military invasion. Both actions are aggressive and have no international legal basis. To implement them, Ukraine needs to withdraw from the agreements regarding the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, the participants of which, along with Ukraine, are the Russian Federation, the EU, the USA and the OSCE, or violate these agreements.
If such actions are used, the question arises against whom Ukraine will be “friends” - against a third of the population of Transnistria, who consider themselves ethnic Ukrainians, against many tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens. These people are actually and legally the Ukrainian foreign diaspora, and one of the largest in the world. Name at least one state in the world that would blockade or fight against its diaspora? Does the Ukrainian state, already experiencing a serious crisis, need such a “record” that negatively characterizes it in the international arena?
Further, let us assume that the alliance between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova achieved its goals. You need to understand that the statehood of Transnistria can only be liquidated under the conditions dictated by the Republic of Moldova. What status will Ukrainian citizens living in Transnistria acquire in this case? If this is the status provided for by the new legislation of the Republic of Moldova on the suppression of “anti-state” actions, then is Ukraine ready to condemn its own diaspora to criminal prosecution in the Republic of Moldova? Or will it conduct any separate negotiations on this matter outside the framework of the negotiation process supervised by the OSCE? Maybe Ukraine is ready to accept tens of thousands of refugees from Transnistria with Ukrainian passports? All these questions can be answered only within the framework of the negotiation process on the Transnistrian problem, the format of which exists and has proven its validity. Therefore, it is in Ukraine’s interests to maintain the current state of affairs and the format of negotiations.
So, Not a single method of influencing Transnistria available to Ukraine today allows it to achieve any political goals without a significant deterioration in its international position.
Let's analyze the means that Ukraine has to put pressure on Transnistria. The first method of pressure - border blockade - is theoretically available, but practically impossible to implement without significant political losses for Ukraine, due to the need to withdraw from a large number of multilateral international agreements, as well as significant economic losses. The second method of pressure is military action. Today it is one of the most frequent subjects of discussion from the average person’s kitchen to the offices of civil servants.
If we assume that Ukraine is ready to break all multilateral international agreements, sacrifice its economic interests, lose IMF loans, jeopardize the international gas pipeline passing through the territory of Transnistria, leave a significant part of the Odessa region without electricity and attack Transnistria by armed means, then we need to assess Does it have the necessary resources for this?
For a military attack in Transnistria, Ukraine needs to concentrate up to 30 thousand military personnel in the Transnistrian sector and be prepared to suffer serious losses of people and equipment as a result of the actions of the armed forces of Transnistria, the Operational Group of Russian troops, and also, with a high degree of probability, the Crimean group of Russian troops and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation (since in this case Ukraine becomes an aggressor attacking Russian troops and Russian citizens living in Transnistria). At the same time, Ukraine needs to maintain the necessary concentration of troops on the border with Romania, Hungary (countries making territorial claims to Ukraine), in the combat zone in the East of Ukraine. There is simply no such grouping of troops on the territory of Ukraine today.
Thus, the people of Ukraine, the Ukrainian state do not receive any dividends in the event of an aggressive policy towards Transnistria. In any case, for Ukraine there will be human, material, and it is also possible that territorial losses without any foreseeable benefits.
So, there are no motives or resources for a clash of interests of our peoples, either today or in the foreseeable future, and neither the Ukrainian state nor Transnistria has them. We can only hope that Ukrainian and Transnistrian politicians in their activities will be guided exclusively by the interests of their people and their state, which have never been and, we hope, will not contain even the slightest elements of antagonism.
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