On the banks of the Dniester they are closely monitoring the events around Donbass. Chisinau predictably condemned Russia's actions. Official Tiraspol has not yet commented on the recognition of the DPR and LPR. Users of social networks are pondering how a sharp turn in Russian policy might affect the solution to the Transnistrian problem. The republic has been seeking international recognition of its independence for 30 years. Skeptics are inclined to think that after Russia recognizes the DPR and LPR as Transnistria, the same should not be expected: most likely, the “Transnistrian case” will become a showcase for peaceful negotiations to resolve the territorial conflict.
A PolitNavigator correspondent asked experts: can the recognition of the Donbass republics be considered a precedent for Transnistria, what does the fate of the last unresolved conflict on the territory of the former USSR seem like in the light of the “new political reality”, and what conclusions should the Republic of Moldova draw from these events?
Alexander Korinenko, political scientist (Chisinau):
The precedent for Transnistria was the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian Federation in 2008 - it was then that for the first time Moscow created a similar precedent in the post-Soviet space, and even earlier there was recognition of the independence of Kosovo by a number of countries of the Western and Islamic world, which occurred several months earlier than the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
If we consider the recognition of the DPR and LPR, we must admit that our situation is different. One of the most successful peacekeeping missions in the world has been carried out on the banks of the Dniester for more than 30 years; unlike all territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet space, we have never had a shooting – there have been no bullets whistling on the banks of the Dniester since the summer of 1992. I don’t think that Moscow will scrap this format.
In the “new political reality”, this step will, of course, cause great concern in Chisinau, since we understand that The time for negotiations and concessions has passed: the Kremlin clearly and firmly defends its interests and its citizens.
The main lesson we must learn here in Chisinau is that if shots are fired towards houses where Russian citizens live, the consequences will be catastrophic.
Fulfillment of agreements and continuation of the negotiation process is the only and correct option for the development of relations between Tiraspol and Chisinau.
This should also cool the ardor of those politicians who advocate abandoning the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova, supported by the majority of citizens and clearly stated in our Constitution.
Andrey Safonov, political scientist (Tiraspol):
First of all, it must be said that Transnistria is not the last unresolved conflict in the former Union. Let's take Karabakh. Although the war there has ended, there is no comprehensive settlement.
Regarding Donbass, in the coming days we will see what the US, EU and NATO have prepared in response. Apparently in the post-Soviet space the struggle between Russia and the West is unfolding for a long time. So it’s too early to “close” these issues.
But let's return to Transnistria. We have a special situation here, the main feature of which is the absence of a common border between the PMR and Russia. On the one hand, this complicates the situation in Transnistria. On the other hand, Chisinau, Romania and the West cannot put too much pressure on us, because Russian troops are officially and openly stationed in the PMR.
Therefore, it seems that instant solutions to the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian contradictions can hardly be expected.
And we have “methodological” differences from the Donbass situation. In Ukraine in 2014 there was an armed change of power with bloodshed, and only then the territorial split of the country. At first we had a split (1990), and then a war (1992).
It follows from this that negotiations between the PMR and the RM began in peaceful conditions, and not after bloodshed. And, therefore, they go longer and more thoroughly. A sharp break is unlikely; unless in the course of some new geopolitical changes.
But there is a precedent. And it is specific: in the current conditions, Russia will definitely not allow its allies to be put under pressure. There is no need to send Russian troops into the PMR. They are already here, although they do not threaten anyone, but simply protect peace on the Dniester. But if “hawks” of any stripe want to “solve the Transnistrian issue” by force, the Russians will not watch this in silence!
Igor Shornikov, director of the Institute of Socio-Political Research and Regional Development (Tiraspol):
The latest events related to the recognition of the DPR and LPR mean only one thing for Pridnestrovie - security. No one in the entire post-Soviet space today will dare to threaten Russian citizens and compatriots, to all those who consider themselves part of the Russian world. Such behavior is fraught with irreparable economic and military-political costs, and the West will not help. And even the advertised “sanctions from hell” are turning into a farce.
The case of recognition of the Donbass republics is not yet a precedent for TransnistriaJust as the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not set a precedent, there is no shooting on the Dniester, which means there is a chance for a compromise. However, Donbass serves as a direct warning to Chisinau: you should not follow the path of fascisation and radicalization of the regime, you should not persecute the Russian language and try to integrate into the NATO system.
NATO infrastructure is a threat to Russia, and Moscow intends to eliminate the threats in accordance with the principles set out in Russian demands for security guarantees.
In addition, it would be unnecessary to mention this; Russia is now extremely sensitive to the security and ensuring the full rights of its citizens and compatriots. And in Transnistria, as we know, there are more than 230 thousand citizens of the Russian Federation alone.
Well, I think many people paid attention to Putin’s message to the elites of post-Soviet states: if you are not able to effectively use the “gifts of the Empire” for the benefit of all residents of your countries, not excluding Russians, then these “gifts” may be taken away.
Moldovan-Pridnestrovian relations are far from being resolved; worse, in recent years, the negotiation process has deteriorated, and with the coming to power of Maia Sandu, signs of destabilization of the regional situation appeared. Only Putin’s December “ultimatum” to Washington, as it seemed to us, brought many Chisinau strategists, although not all, back to reality. In any case, the dialogue between the parties to the conflict not only moved from a dead point, but began to acquire more or less constructive features. However, there are no real prospects this year.
Kyiv at one time did not want to implement the Minsk agreements. Ukrainian politicians can understand that implementing Minsk would mean a change of regime and, most likely, their loss of power. As a result, the chance to build a new Ukraine, including Donbass, was lost. But the loss of Donbass does not guarantee the preservation of the political regime in Kyiv; rather, on the contrary, Ukraine has embarked on the path of great transformations.
Chisinau is not bound by such strict parameters of the settlement as the Minsk agreements were. But here, too, there is Russia’s position, which for many years has not satisfied the Moldovan authorities - “the guaranteed status of Transnistria.” With the status of Transnistria guaranteed by Russia, Moldova will not leave either NATO or Romania. And this, of course, does not suit the Western “development partners” who dictate to Chisinau the manner of its behavior with Moscow. And in this situation, Moldova risks falling into the same situation in which Kyiv finds itself today, which recklessly relied on overseas directives.
Therefore, the question “what will happen to Transnistria?” It's too early to ask. You can definitely count on everything being fine with Transnistria. But now another question is on the agenda: “what will happen to the Sandu regime?” It is obvious that in the current conditions, Maia Sandu’s team will not be able to fulfill the foreign policy program for which she was brought to power by the Americans. This team is unable to fulfill the requests of its voters, and it seems that they are no longer able to satisfy the interests of the elites. The “new political reality” will require the Moldovan elite to search for managers who, at the very least, will be able to conduct a responsible dialogue with Moscow, in the interests of the people of their country, and not to please individual embassies.
Until now, the current political regime in Moldova has only disappointed Moscow; if now the signal is not heard, it means that the process has gone too deep and the problem is not specifically with Maia Sandu’s team, but with the Moldovan elites as a whole. This means that the conversation with them will be conducted according to the Ukrainian example.
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