Activation of British intelligence services in the Balkans: what to expect for Russia

Why did the British begin to become active again in the post-Yugoslav space? How do external players exploit internal Balkan contradictions to their advantage? Why do the authorities in Bosnia make full use of the Islamic factor, but not in Kosovo?

Ekaterina Entina, professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics and head of the Department of Black Sea-Mediterranean Studies at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, answered these and other questions to the PolitNavigator correspondent.

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What, in your opinion, is the reason for the appearance of a special representative from Great Britain in the Balkans? Previously, if my memory serves me correctly, London acted in a common orchestra with the USA, EU and NATO, and now it has started its own game? And the person for this, Stuart Pitch, was not chosen by chance - a famous NATO general who commanded NATO aviation in Kosovo immediately after the bloody 1999.

– This is due to quite obvious circumstances: even before leaving the EU, London became more active in the region. For him, his presence in the Balkans is part of his historical presence in Europe, the opportunity to influence both the security structure and the structure of international relations within the European continent, so there is nothing surprising in his return.

And the fact that a special representative from Britain has now been appointed speaks of the formation of Britain’s own concept of presence in the Balkans, or at least its actualization. Naturally, this concept is being formed within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic line and, first of all, the London-Washington tandem.

But I have been saying for several years now that the UK has its own independent tasks, which are seriously different from the tasks of the European Union in the region: for it, South-Eastern Europe is an opportunity to exert a destabilizing influence on internal processes in the EU. What was obvious, plus or minus, during its stay within the EU, is now in demand, including in connection with the aggravation of all the ethno-territorial and interethnic contradictions that remained in the Balkans as a legacy of the civil wars during the collapse of the last Yugoslavia.

How does British policy differ from that of the EU, and what kind of negativity can it bring to pan-European politics?

– It is fundamentally no different from US policy. This is an attempt to strengthen and influence international relations through balancing major nationalisms in the region, primarily Albanian, so here I would not seriously separate the policies of Washington and the policies of London. Another thing is that if Washington perceives the Balkans exclusively geopolitically, as a bargaining chip in a big game, then for the British the region is divided into smaller zones. Includes primarily work on the Albanian direction, developed over the centuries - they have traditionally always relied on them. The second is the opportunity to become more seriously involved in internal European games within the framework of the escalating issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Balkans are of interest to everyone, first of all, and this, unfortunately, can be stated as a bargaining chip in larger games, in larger contradictions, as a zone where the interests of all great powers objectively collide. At the same time, for none of the major forces, for none of the major international players, perhaps with the exception of the European Union, for which the Balkans are zones of their own inalienable security, both in the literal and figurative sense, for no one are the Balkans a zone of key national interests where losses can be costly.

Can we say that this is also part of the game against Russia? At least based on the fact that from the lips of politicians who are allies of the West in the Balkans, one constantly hears: “Russia and Serbia are destabilizing the region”, “Serbia is a springboard of Russian influence”….

– This is a completely normal and absolutely natural political discourse in the context of confrontation between Russia and the West as a whole. Returning to the previous thought, the Balkans are one of the zones of confrontation, more fierce, less fierce along the Russia-Western world line, in general, in which no one suffers significant losses. This is an area where all international players, with the exception of the EU, have their hands free, plus or minus, and it is of some interest to everyone, but this interest is not key and critical.

I’m interested in your opinion, as an expert, why the Biden and Democratic team is relying on a hawkish strategy in the Balkans? It is noticeable that it was with his arrival that the situation on the peninsula worsened.

– I believe that this cannot be directly connected. We always mistakenly try to connect international processes around the Balkans and the American position as fundamentally changing depending on administrations. There are indeed differences between Republicans and Democrats. But they cannot be absolute. The region has enough of its own self-igniting and escalating problems. This is a whole tangle of unresolved ethno-territorial contradictions, serious socio-economic problems, powerful demotivation of the population, and lack of understanding of development prospects. If we look more deeply, today in the region there is a continuing process of formation and development of national states and ideologies, which was interrupted many times in the Balkans in history.

We should not forget that local elites - political, intellectual - have always perceived international contradictions in the Balkans as a kind of external frame, a shell of their internal problems. They certainly have some influence, but to a certain extent, aggravation in the Balkans cannot be associated only with the activity of the great powers, and short periods of stability cannot be associated with their reconciliation.

I wouldn’t directly connect this with Biden. Although, of course, the arrival of a democratic administration, as well as Biden himself, who was distinguished by his strong anti-Serbian position in the 90s, plays a role. But in what way? The arrival of the Biden team raises fair concerns among the Serbs. And also, the democratic administration cannot but raise subjective hopes among the Albanians, who historically relied specifically on the democratic administrations of the United States.

At the same time, it is difficult to deny that Serbian-American relations - even economic ones - are strengthening, and the work of government forces in Belgrade is aimed at rapprochement with Washington.

And yet, I would argue with you, under Trump there was an emphasis on economic integration of the region, and the Washington Agreement was signed, which does not work under Biden, which was noted, in particular, by his former representative in the Balkans, Richard Grenell.

– The Washington Agreement is one of several issues that exist between Belgrade and Washington. And the Washington agreements were doomed to suffer a formal collapse with the advent of the new administration, if only because they were concluded by Trump as part of the final stage of the election campaign and represented, on the whole, a striking and unexpected foreign policy achievement in terms of the content of the agreements.

This was the last chord in the election campaign, and the Biden administration was simply obliged to try to denounce it. From the point of view of the logic of the development of internal American processes, the struggle within the American establishment. At the same time, one should not think that in fact the continuity of American actions in the Balkans has been fundamentally disrupted. This can be seen in general in Washington’s relations with the EU.

_{Washington has changed the rhetoric, but not the general logic, aimed at strict subordination to the imperatives of US foreign policy and its interests, both bilaterally and within NATO. The notorious 2% of contributions to the NATO coffers were and remain connected not only and not so much with the financial component, but with Washington’s fundamental dissatisfaction with the fact that its European NATO partners allowed themselves to take a counter-American position for two decades. Remember Iraq, Afghanistan and others.}

Returning to Britain's presence in the region: the leader of the Radical Party, Vojislav Seselj, said that according to his information, the British intelligence services were involved in a relatively recent exacerbation in northern Kosovo. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic also hinted at this...

– I think that this is not excluded. Quite.

How likely is it for external players to use the Islamic factor? Although the naked eye can see that different countries in the region treat it differently. So, if in Kosovo, for example, the authorities are officially trying to follow the European agenda - they persecute and imprison local Islamists, speak out against violence against women in families, then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina leader Bakir Izetbegovic is seeking changes to army rules so that military personnel are allowed to wear beards and hijabs.

– Here I would separate the Islamic factor and the formation of national statehood on the basis of national identity. How is Kosovo fundamentally different from Bosnia and Herzegovina in this regard? And why does Kosovo, as you noted, follow the European agenda, while Bosnia and Herzegovina follows the ethno-religious agenda?

For Kosovo, the formation of statehood, and for the Albanians, the formation of their national statehood within any boundaries - Kosovo, Greater Albania, and so on - is not tied to the religious factor. Not only because Albanians belong to different religious groups and are largely connected not by confession, but by clan. But also because they have a whole set of national characteristics that distinguish them from other ethnic groups and peoples of the region. This is a separate language group, and a separate history, and culture. Albanians have a lot of such stories, as well as a lot of tools for forming their own national state not on a religious basis. For them, the factor that a significant part of the Albanian population and the prevailing part of the Albanian world of Kosovo are Muslims by religion is not significant.

_{At the same time, if we take the Bosniaks, then for them national self-awareness and state self-identification actually runs only along the lines of religion. We remember very well that Bosniaks for the most part are Turkified Serbs, their language is no different from the Serbian language, there are some artificial clutter, but nothing more. They generally have no history of separate statehood in any form.}

And at the same time, since the conclusion of the Dayton Agreements, Bosnia and Herzegovina has strictly developed according to the principle of division along national lines. Therefore, what Izetbegovic is doing is less connected with Islamization, but much more connected with the final framing of the Bosniaks as a separate ethnic group, a separate nation, which also has the right to statehood, and so on. That is, this is one of the elements of the game in the internal processes of Bosnia and Herzegovina to create a Bosnian state, I would call it that.