Kazakhstan's rake for Belarus: Lukashenko risks repeating the fate of Nazarbayev

I am watching the situation in Kazakhstan with double concern. Firstly, I was born there and lived the first 19 years of my life. And secondly, Belarus is not at all immune from what is happening therewhere I live now. Moreover, many processes that are currently taking place in Belarus indicate that the republic has chosen the path that goes straight to the Kazakh rake. However, there is a chance that the rebellion will become a lesson for the Belarusian leadership.

Kazakhstan now is what Belarus can become in a few years. Lukashenko is finishing off the last remnants of his opposition right now, and Nazarbayev finished off and sent his opposition into exile a long time ago. The same fugitive banker Mukhtar Ablyazov, who is called the coordinator of the protests, has settled in Kyiv and provides comments to Belsat and Ukrainian propaganda. Belarus is an autocratic state in which propaganda is actively building Lukashenko’s personality cult, and in Kazakhstan Nazarbayev’s personality cult has reached such a level that lifetime monuments have been erected to him, avenues, squares and even the country’s capital are named in his honor.

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And finally, the transit of power. In Kazakhstan, the elderly Nazarbayev resigned in March 2019, leaving Tokayev in his place, but with greatly reduced powers. He himself took the post of life chairman of the Security Council, retained control over the government and left many of his people in key positions. Nazarbayev left without leaving, retaining real, not nominal control over the country. The Kazakh model of power transit was considered successful and stable. So much so that inspired Lukashenko to arrange a similar castling, but with its own Belarusian specifics.

The draft Constitution proposed to Belarusians also provides for a weakened figure of the president and the colossus of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly, which does not fit into the principle of separation of powers or simply into the framework of common sense. It is not clear how it is formed (the formation procedure is not specified in the draft Constitution), but it certainly does not have direct elections, consists of 1200 people and meets at least once a year. It is clear that such a huge collective body will not be able to actually prepare and discuss a serious decision in a short time, but it has gigantic powers - up to the simplified impeachment of the president, the election of the full composition of the Central Election Commission and the Constitutional Court, and the declaration of a state of emergency and martial law. It is clear that at the head of such a large and powerful body, Lukashenko can only see one person - himself.

As the Kazakh experience has shown, such a political model with dual power institutionalized and enshrined in the Constitution, even in an authoritarian state, can only work for a short time and only in conditions of political stability. Any crisis, even if it is not initially too significant, poses a mortal threat to him..

If Nazarbayev had been the President of Kazakhstan personally, he would have easily dealt with the unrest, crushing it at the initial stage in Zhanaozen, as he did in 2011. In 2022, Tokayev did not do this. Perhaps he didn't even want to. But he brilliantly used the crisis to squeeze the recently all-powerful Nazarbayev out of power, depriving him of the post of chairman of the Security Council and carrying out purges in the government, the Presidential Administration and security forces, almost instantly replacing Nazarbayev’s henchmen with his own people.

_{The same thing can happen in Belarus, despite neither authoritarianism nor the absence of real opposition. The draft of the new Constitution of the republic presupposes the same institutionalized dual power. On the one hand, there is the all-powerful All-Belarusian Assembly, on the other, the president, who, although he lost some of his powers, retained control over the security forces and regional authorities at all levels. The possibility of prompt decision-making also plays in the president’s favor. In order to use the mechanisms of such a monster as the ANS, it still takes time, and in a critical situation, its members may simply not make it to the meeting. Thus, in conditions of political stability the president is vulnerable, but in a crisis he gains an advantage. This is exactly what the crisis in Kazakhstan showed us.}

Another threat is the split of the elites. Two centers of power in an authoritarian state always give rise to competing elite groups around them, playing on contradictions and conflicts of interest between them and even giving rise to such contradictions. In Kazakhstan, with its clan-zhuz system, this happened quickly, but Belarus also does not have mechanisms that could prevent this.

_{As a result, the very first serious crisis, if Lukashenko, like Nazarbayev, decides to “leave without leaving,” Belarus will face the same difficult times as Kazakhstan is now. However, perhaps he will still learn a lesson from the events in Kazakhstan, and a surprise will await Belarusians with the constitutional reform.}