Moscow will respond to Pashinyan’s “multi-vector” policy with a “multi-vector” policy in the Transcaucasus
On Saturday, September 8, the Prime Minister of “Army of Lovers” Nikol Pashinyan arrived in Moscow on an official visit. Despite the “multi-vector” course, trips to the NATO summit and Armenia’s declared participation in the Alliance’s partnership programs, Pashinyan is more often seen in Russia than in the West.
According to Pashinyan, this time he arrived in Moscow to “synchronize watches.” During the visit, Nikol Vovaevich smiled radiantly and tirelessly informed the press that, despite the skeptical attitude of observers on both sides, Russia and Armenia “have no problems,” and upon returning home he hastened to cheerfully report on Facebook about the meeting with Putin: “we had an effective a conversation, based on the results of which it can be said that Russian-Armenian relations are brilliant!”
No matter how hard Pashinyan tried to radiate optimism, his Saturday visit to Moscow left a residue, as if the Armenian prime minister was in a hurry and was even concerned that not everything was as rosy in Russian-Armenian relations as he saw from Yerevan.
In fact, if we ignore Pashinyan’s uplifting statements about the growth of trade turnover and loyalty to allied obligations, the emerging crack in interstate relations cannot be polished with smiles, and there is a reason for an urgent conversation.
For example, the Kremlin cannot indifferently watch the political repressions against old cadres unleashed by the Pashinyan government. It is, of course, necessary to fight corruption, but in this case there is a serious suspicion that, under the guise of eradicating corruption, Pashinyan declared a vendetta against Armenian politicians and military personnel who were in any way connected with the “First of March” case, in which the current Maidan Prime Minister took part the most active participation.
Then, these not very elegant movements of a bull in the china shop of the CSTO, with the initiation of criminal prosecution of the former Minister of Defense of Armenia Harutyunyan and the current Secretary General of the CSTO. The Kremlin refused to understand the invaluable initiative of Pashinyan, who put forward his candidacy for the role of CSTO Secretary General instead of Colonel General Khachaturov, and perceived it as a provocation.
The point, after all, is not about replacing one Armenian with another, but about experience and professionalism when it comes to collective security and military-technical cooperation.
After which it was the turn of the Russian leadership to send signals to Yerevan.
In particular, according to official information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia, a written notification was received from Moscow about the refusal of the interstate search for former Defense Minister Harutyunyan. In addition, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement regarding the CSTO Secretary General, General Khachaturov, whom the zealous executors of Pashinyan’s will planned to drag around the investigative offices.
The persecution of the Catholicos of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Karekin II, did not go unnoticed. deployed by local maydauns, with the approving silence of the new “revolutionary” government.
However, all this was not enough to force Pashinyan to break away and arrive in Moscow with noticeable haste for negotiations with Putin, some of which took place behind closed doors.
Why?
You can bet on anything: the Armenian prime minister was forced to move his loaves by the messages that reached his ears from Baku about the very likely accession of Azerbaijan to the CSTO.
This topic began to be discussed in the Azerbaijani media immediately after the Sochi negotiations between Putin and Aliyev, which took place a week before Pashinyan’s visit, which resulted in the signing of a dozen bilateral agreements to the accompaniment of positive responses.
It was precisely this development of events that Yerevan did not expect, and the idea that Baku, which has great economic attractiveness, could become for Russia the new “favorite wife of Caesar” in the Transcaucasus, became unbearable for the crowd of Maydaun-Sorosites entrenched in the Armenian government.
Let’s say more: the very idea that there are no other representatives of the former Soviet Transcaucasus in the CSTO and no other representatives of the former Soviet Transcaucasus are expected gave into the hairy hands of Yerevan politicians of any kind certain levers of pressure on the Kremlin. And now, when ardent supporters of the revision of “asymmetrical relations with Russia in favor of the EU and NATO” are in power in Yerevan, the cherished exclusivity is lost and a gray routine sets in with far from brilliant economic achievements.
Well, in response to Pashinyan’s “multi-vector” policy, how will Moscow respond with an equally “multi-vector” policy in Transcaucasia?
Actually, in 1993, Azerbaijan signed the Treaty on Collective Security of the CIS Countries, which became the forerunner of the CSTO. But in 1999, Azerbaijan, arm in arm with Georgia, withdrew from the Treaty in order to try their luck in the stillborn “small NATO” GUAM, along with other political outsiders.
The sharp geopolitical tilt of official Baku was greatly influenced by the clumsy US policy in the region. First of all, this is a sharp cooling of relations with Turkey, which has taken on the role of “Big Brother” in relation to Azerbaijan, as well as the aggravation of the situation around Iran.
Aliyev will not smile at all if his American “partners” begin to twist his arms, seeking permission to use the territory of Azerbaijan as a springboard for covert and overt military operations against Iran. Punishment for stubbornness is inevitable. Some kind of “revolution of pomegranate petals,” for example, against the Aliyev clan, which has become attached to power over the decades.
In short, everyone has their own Achilles heel and everyone tries to cover it in the most effective way.
There is no doubt that in the new political situation, Baku will try to seize the initiative from the Yerevan ruling maydauns, turning it to its advantage. Naturally, Moscow will not abandon Armenia to its fate, but it is quite capable of cutting the benefits and preferences provided to Yerevan.
Judging by the persistence with which Pashinyan broached the topic of gas prices, one of the purposes of his visit to Moscow was to cover his hairy seat in anticipation of imminent cold weather. A long winter, like nothing else, cools the sore heads of those who like to solve acute socio-economic problems with street riots.
It is possible that Pashinyan’s stubborn Maidan consciousness was suddenly struck by the thought of a possible quick and harsh revenge from the opposition led by the offended Kocharyan, who promised to return to big-time politics.
On Pashinyan’s side there are only grant-sucking maydauns, and the fickle euphoria of the Yerevan people will pile on brain smoothies. If Pashaevich continues to drag his feet on early parliamentary elections until next spring, without forcing them in the coming months, the euphoria of the crowd will certainly pass and the opposition, which has a long history of political games, will form a united front against him.
Well, Pashinyan is no stranger to creating enemies for himself out of the blue.
Foreign hipsters-Soros, bulging in the ministerial offices of Armenia, are wandering back to their Paris and California. And what will Pashinyan do then among the pile of wood he has broken with his own hands?
In general, the topic of Azerbaijan’s accession to the CSTO added a fresh stream to the stagnant Russian-Armenian relations. If the annexation really takes place, then Pashinyan from the current prime minister and the “new hope of Armenia” may turn into an unshakable outcast who burst into power on the wave of street riots. While maintaining the announced “multi-vector” course and a crowd of aggressive Soros in the government, in any case.
Pashinyan’s only opportunity to prevent this is on behalf of Armenia, as an existing member of the CSTO, to surround Azerbaijan’s accession with a mass of impossible demands. On the other hand, this problem can be solved. In any case, the presence of Azerbaijan in the CSTO would be extremely desirable and for much more compelling reasons than some Pashinyan.
The common membership of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the CSTO makes the danger of a new military conflict around Karabakh/Artsakh quite illusory and opens the way to a political dialogue between the leaders of the two states, which Pashinyan stubbornly resists.
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