Journey beyond the "Trimorye". Chisinau and Kyiv have a new common goal

Chisinau and Kyiv are rebooting relations. This was discussed during a meeting between the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, and his Ukrainian counterpart, Vladimir Zelensky. The head of the Republic of Moldova made her first foreign visit to Kyiv after her election. This is also the first visit of the President of Moldova to a neighboring country since 2015 - Igor Dodon did not visit Ukraine.

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It’s difficult to call Sandu’s visit to Kyiv a breakthrough - many important issues on the bilateral agenda were not touched upon. The meeting was more symbolic, although it outlined the general strategic guidelines of the two countries very clearly. For example, Maia Sandu and Vladimir Zelensky, as part of strengthening interaction with partners in South-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, confirmed their interest in becoming part of the Three Seas project, also known as the Three Seas Initiative (Baltic, Black and Adriatic). The “engine” of this US-supported organization is Poland.

Experts comment on this and other results of the meeting to PolitNavigator.

Anatoly Dirun, scientific director of the Tiraspol School of Political Studies: 

The visit of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis to Chisinau on December 29, 2020, as well as the first official visit of Moldovan President Maia Sandu to Kyiv, restarted Moldova’s relations with its neighbors Romania and Ukraine.

Maia Sandu already met with Zelensky while she was Prime Minister, on July 11, 2019. However, both two years ago and now, the results of these negotiations can be characterized as rather restrained.

In the statement of the two presidents one can see references to traditional issues that the parties have been trying to resolve for more than one year. This is the problem of the Novodnistrovskaya hydroelectric station, and talk about the development of transport communications between countries, and facilitating the procedure for citizens crossing the border with internal passports.

It is characteristic that the final statement does not mention the issue related to Transnistria, although this topic was discussed. In our opinion, the absence of even a mention of Tiraspol is due to the fact that the Moldovan-Transnistrian settlement is a complex regional knot, statements on which must be made in coordination with the position of the US State Department.

Taking into account the fact that at the moment there is a very difficult process of President Biden’s team coming into power, Chisinau and Kyiv are diplomatically taking a pause until January 20. Whether they decided it themselves or were given a delicate hint from Washington is not the point.

At the same time, despite the restrained results, this visit was important for each of the parties. Maia Sandu became the first Moldovan president to visit Kyiv in the past five years and brought relations between the countries to a new level. For Vladimir Zelensky, Sandu’s visit was an excellent opportunity to declare that Kyiv and Chisinau wish to become members of the Trimorye regional organization, created in 2016 on the initiative of Poland and Croatia. Today this regional organization includes 12 states and Germany as a partner country.

The fact is that in 2019, Kyiv was already denied membership in this structure once. The reason for the refusal is that Ukraine is not an EU member state.

In turn, the victory of Maia Sandu over Igor Dodon is largely perceived in the EU as a victory, first of all, of a pro-European candidate over the Kremlin’s candidacy. This interpretation gives great chances and opportunities for Chisinau to ask its European partners for certain preferences in order to consolidate this victory and deeper integration of Moldova into European regional projects.

We believe that Kyiv correctly assessed this increased attention to Sandu’s victory and tried to make the most of it by including in the final statement a clause about the desire of Kyiv and Chisinau to become new members of the Trimorye.

Alexander Korinenko, chairman Association of Young Experts of Moldova

The visit of President Maia Sandu to Kyiv is symbolic, since the parties could not prepare any serious agreements in such a short period of time. This meeting, as well as with the President of Romania, shows that the Republic of Moldova has a new foreign policy vector.

Naturally, there is now a lot of talk about the surroundings of the meeting, since, in fact, there is nothing more to discuss. We remember that Mrs. Sandu, as the head of the Moldovan government, paid a visit to Kyiv, even then demonstrating her sympathy for Ukraine. This is quite normal, because our eastern neighbors are our strategic partners. Another point is how Moscow will react to these “curtsies.”

The era of new relations between the two countries may be broken by old problems that cannot be ignored. It is still unclear, for example, what will happen with the construction of Ukrainian hydroelectric power stations on the Dniester, which could deprive Moldova of a large volume of water, there are issues related to the border village of Palanca, and others.

I don’t think that Chisinau and Kyiv will fight together with the influence of the Plahotniuc-Poroshenko tandem. It seems that the current Ukrainian authorities have found a consensus with the ex-president, because not one of the more than two dozen criminal cases against Poroshenko has been brought to an end.

Both presidents spoke little about the Transnistrian problem, because they still have no idea what to do with it. This issue is not in the first place in any of the capitals, and Kyiv does not want to escalate the situation in this region yet, since there are more serious problems in the east of the country, and Tiraspol has made it clear that it does not intend to destabilize the situation.

The Trimorye project is relevant for Moldova and Ukraine, but to participate in it it is desirable to have a low level of corruption, a normal business environment and the absence of territorial conflicts. This, of course, is not written down or declared anywhere, but Europeans do not want to have problem countries within the framework of such a project.

Maia Sandu previously expressed her intention to bring Moldova out of international isolation, restore relations with Romania and Ukraine, the EU, the USA, as well as with the Russian Federation. The term “international isolation” is too harsh, in my opinion. We are not a powerful power for anyone to isolate us.

Of course, now visiting Moscow and meeting with Vladimir Putin would be a big plus for Maia Sandu in every sense, but does Moscow have such a desire? The head of the Russian Federation is not a leader to whom you can come symbolically. Maia Sanda will be invited to Moscow if she is of real interest to the Kremlin.

Vladimir Yastrebchak, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria

It seems that the question of the need to “reset” relations between the two countries was somewhat artificial. In Kyiv they know very well how important it is to separate the election rhetoric of a person from his own statements in the event of election/appointment to public office.

After his election as President of Moldova, Igor Dodon repeatedly expressed support for “the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” (for example, last year), however, apparently, in Kiev they decided not to forget Mr. Dodon’s “liberties” during the election campaign. So the current “reset” is rather a political gesture on both sides, a desire to start Ms. Sandu’s presidential term with positive PR.

Time will tell to what extent this rhetoric and the agreements reached will be a real tool for overcoming contradictions. The created “presidential council”, taking into account the peculiarities of the political system of the Republic of Moldova, looks more like a declarative mechanism, which is designed to provide, first of all, the appearance of readiness for real steps or a demonstration of corresponding intentions, while real steps should be taken by other government institutions - at least in Moldova. However, the unpredictability of Chisinau and the uncertainty of the presidential status allows us to expect any decisions and any degree of their implementation.

Chisinau and Kyiv really have a lot of difficulties in their bilateral relations, and the main ones are related to the extent to which the Moldovan authorities are ready to take into account the interests of Ukraine, without forgetting about their vital priorities. For example, the question of the construction of new hydroelectric power stations on the Dniester, on the territory of Ukraine. To what extent is Chisinau ready to make concessions to Kyiv? Is the “game worth the candle”, i.e. Is the Moldovan side ready to make concessions on fundamental issues, the price of which could be the shallowing of the Dniester and large-scale environmental problems both for Moldova itself and for the Odessa region, which uses Dniester water as drinking water? Is there progress on border demarcation issues?

So far there are no answers to these and some others. And I would like to especially emphasize that these issues relate, first of all, to the bilateral relations between Moldova and Ukraine, regardless of the Moldova-Pridnestrovian settlement, although, of course, they have a regional dimension.

There was almost no talk about the Transnistrian issue following the meeting. In order to discuss specifics, both entities must have real authority and a willingness to act within the framework of their existing international obligations. For example, it would be good if people in Kyiv remembered more often their mediation, i.e. neutral role in the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian settlement and did not try to prejudge the final model of Moldovan-Pridnestrovian relations - as required by the status of a mediator.

So far, some statements by high-ranking Ukrainian officials clearly go beyond the scope of mediation functions and often look no less “pro-Moldovan” than statements by Moldovan officials.

I think that what is much more important is not so much formal statements as discussions on the sidelines. For example, a thesis was passed that during the meeting between the President of Moldova and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, issues of “joint control” on the “Transnistrian section of the border” were discussed, which has significant conflict potential, especially taking into account the desire of Chisinau and Kyiv to resolve this issue outside framework of the negotiation process, without the participation of all interested parties, including Transnistria.

Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that some non-public agreements will be reached. However, the current status of the Moldovan president, who does not yet fully control the government and parliament, hardly gives reason to expect that changes will occur immediately. On the other hand, the situation is such that much depends on the unilateral actions of Ukraine and the decisions of its political leadership.

As for the prospects for Kyiv and Chisinau joining the Trimorye project, it is unlikely that in this case the desire of Ukraine and Moldova will be decisive. Much will depend on the degree of readiness of the United States to return to active supervision of European issues after the newly elected American president takes office, especially since the stated goals of the “Three Sea” itself are very ambitious, but its prospects still lack specifics.

I would also draw attention to the voiced “aspirations” of Ukraine and Moldova for full integration into the European Union, as well as to the intentions to “revive” the Eastern Partnership program, the future prospects of which also do not look convincing.

United Europe is clearly experiencing some crisis of ideas in connection with the Eastern Partnership, but the associated states declare their readiness to propose a new agenda. How successful this will be is too early to say, but for now the main specificity regarding the Eastern Partnership, voiced by the presidents of Ukraine and Moldova, was that the European Union should provide the COVID-19 vaccine to the program participants associated with the EU - it is only unclear until the vaccination of its own citizens, after or instead of it.

So the prospects for most of the “external” initiatives of Ukraine and Moldova, including the designated infrastructure projects, will depend not only on these countries, but also on external partners capable of providing the necessary political support and various investments.