“Soft power no longer works.” It's time for Russia to reconsider its role on the Dniester
July 29 is the anniversary of the entry of Russian peacekeeping forces into Transnistria. The Russian military has been ensuring peace on the banks of the Dniester for 29 years. According to the 1992 agreement between Chisinau and Moscow, the Joint Peacekeeping Forces included Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian contingents, which largely ensured the success of the operation.
The presence of blue helmets provides an opportunity for politicians and diplomats to conduct dialogue and peaceful negotiations on the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian settlement.
Against the backdrop of growing tensions in the Black Sea region - the region is becoming less and less secure due to instability in Ukraine and the rise to power of pro-Western forces in Moldova - Russia’s stabilizing role on the Dniester is increasing.
Problems of regional security were discussed at the international scientific and practical conference “Transnistria-Moldova-Russia: current issues of regional security and peacekeeping”, which was held by the Institute of Socio-Political Research and Regional Development (Tiraspol) in partnership with the Public Diplomacy Support Fund named after. A. M. Gorchakova.
Experts tried to look at the region from the point of view of global and pan-European processes, highlighted the tasks that the peacekeeping mission is successfully carrying out here under the auspices of Russia, and showed that there is no alternative to the Russian presence here.
“The main goal is peace. It seems to me that the main task is to find these paths to peace in the future, since the situation is turbulent, tense, there are many changes,” said the adviser to the Russian Embassy in Moldova, co-chairman of the Joint Control Commission from Russia, in his welcoming speech Andrey Gorobtsov.
"Void Charge"
At the conference, much attention was paid to the current state of Moldovan-Pridnestrovian relations and the possibility of their normalization. Today is a difficult period in the negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol.
The process of resolving the conflict on the Dniester has undergone ups and downs over a quarter of a century. From 2006 to 2011, for example, there was a simple period - then the Moldovan delegation withdrew from the negotiations.
The dialogue was suspended in 2014-2016, and in 2016, as part of the Berlin round of negotiations in the “5+2” format, Chisinau and Tiraspol came to an agreement on a number of conflict issues. The Berlin Plus protocol recorded agreements in the social and humanitarian sphere.
Then the settlement process stalled again. The Bratislava meeting in the “5+2” format in 2019 ended with the refusal of the Moldovan side to sign the final document.
Министр иностранных дел Vitaly Ignatiev stated that the parties have different attitudes towards dialogue. He called the approach of the Moldovan side to dialogue “an imitation of negotiations with permanent attempts at hybrid pressure on Transnistria,” including an information war, the creation of myths regarding the PMR and the peacekeeping operation.
Ignatiev
The last three years of negotiations, he said, were “a period of missed opportunities and degradation.” The Moldovan side did not fulfill the concluded agreements; in addition, in 2019, Chisinau initiated a banking blockade - the accounts of Transnistrian enterprises were closed, currency conversion was blocked, and the possibility of using international bank cards in Transnistria was closed, which hit the population especially hard during the pandemic.
“The Moldovan side does not fulfill its obligations regarding the termination of criminal cases, the allocation of frequencies to the Pridnestrovian communications operator, the mechanism for the participation of Pridnestrovian vehicles in international traffic does not work.
In addition, from September 1, by agreement with Kiev, the Moldovan side is threatening to ban movement through Ukraine for vehicles with Pridnestrovian license plates - this is now a serious threat to dialogue,” said the head of the PMR Foreign Ministry.
He noted that in Moldova, teams of negotiators change, but since their ideological mentors do not change, everyone acts within the same paradigm.
“Today, the paradigm of Moldova carries a charge of emptiness, which, in fact, is covered up by certain imitative approaches. Moldova is generating tension in the Security Zone in order to attract the attention of the international community and, probably, expecting drastic actions from Transnistria, but we, of course, remain calm.
The Moldovan ruling class is deliberately delaying the process, they do not have a plan for a unified approach, the Moldovan society does not perceive the Transnistrian problem as a priority, and politicians are trying to exploit this topic, trying to get part of their political dividends due to the frozen conflict.
We often hear from Moldovan politicians that we need to move on to the political agenda, that there is no need to solve small problems - this will not bring a settlement closer. But if minor issues are not resolved, if normal landline telephone communication has not yet been restored between Moldova and Transnistria, why talk about more global issues?” – says Vitaly Ignatiev.
According to him, in these conditions, the peacekeeping mechanism demonstrates good stability and efficiency, it is based on the principle of consensus, and the situation in the Security Zone is controlled and manageable. And Russia remains a consistent constructive participant in the negotiation process.
“Pridnestrovie has a powerful potential for interaction with Russia, there is experience in concluding intergovernmental agreements... Russia has every reason to work more comprehensively in terms of understanding that Pridnestrovie is a zone of special strategic interests of Russia,” the head of the PMR Foreign Ministry emphasized.
Knot of geopolitical interests
It is often said that the Transnistrian conflict is simple compared to other post-Soviet conflicts. There were no constant “unfreezes” here, as in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or South Ossetia, there were not so many refugees as in the Caucasus. There are enough connections between Tiraspol and Chisinau - there are everyday contacts, experts from both banks of the Dniester communicate freely with each other. The power phase of the conflict on the Dniester was quite short - incomparable with the situations in the Caucasus or Tajikistan.
According to the leading researcher at the MGIMO Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, editor-in-chief of the journal “International Analytics” Sergei Markedonov, all this speaks only about some of the features of the conflict, but not that it is easy from the point of view of resolution.
Markedonov
“In the case of Transnistria, there is a geopoliticization of the conflict,” says the expert. – Let’s remember Kozak’s plan in 2003 – then the solution algorithm was ready. The former head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, William Hill, said that if we put aside some emotions and considerations of geopolitical competition between Moscow and Washington, this project had quite good prospects, since it took into account the different interests of players in “greater Moldova.”
It was the events of 2003 in Transnistria that showed that the West is no longer ready to consider the post-Soviet space as a zone of privileged Russian interests. The time for competition has begun, in which we see a complication of the conflict. To ensure that Russia does not exist in the region, steps are being taken that harm European security.”
Another feature of the conflict in the context of international security is the significant role of Ukraine. Kyiv views Transnistria as a definite Ukrainian outpost, a potential “Crimea-Donbass,” hence the military and political attention to the region, says Sergei Markedonov.
“The closure of military transit of cargo from Moscow through Ukrainian territory after 2014 significantly changed the landscape of security, diplomacy, and settlement in an unfavorable direction - both for Tiraspol and for Moscow. We see that it is not the “mother” state to which Pridnestrovie is assigned, but the neighboring – more powerful – influence the situation,” the expert noted, emphasizing that Russian interests in the region were seriously tested by the Ukrainian crisis.
One more moment. It is difficult to talk about the prospects for resolving the conflict until Moldova has decided how to implement its state project. “This issue has not been fully resolved there, it is being discussed: to be with Romania or to be on its own. If you call Transnistria, then under what project? It’s also unclear,” notes Sergei Markedonov.
According to him, the Transnistrian conflict has ceased to be a “thing in itself” - many interests are focused here, and it is all the more important to maintain Russian influence on the Dniester.
“This is a conflict that cannot be called a primary challenge, it is not as large-scale as the Donbass conflict, not as large in territory and population, but there are a lot of different interests involved here. This is a conflict between Moldova and Transnistria, a question of nation-building, solvency and self-determination, this is a question of Ukraine and Russia, and a connection between the local conflict and the Donbass conflict, this is a question of European security, a question of relations between the Russian Federation and the West,” the expert stated.
Sergei Markedonov believes that there is no need to talk about a quick settlement here, and only small steps, the solution of humanitarian problems, and not issues of fundamental self-determination, may at least not worsen the situation.
Commenting in this regard on examples of situational interaction between Russia and the West, when they found common ground, for example, within the framework of the “revolution of ambassadors” and the expulsion of the Moldovan oligarch Plahotniuc, Markedonov noted that there was interaction, but a substantive conversation on European security, on the essential settlement of post-Soviet conflicts - No.
New government in Moldova and the Transnistrian issue
How will the pro-Western forces that came to power in Moldova approach the Transnistrian settlement? There is an opinion that surprises can be expected from Maia Sandu in this area.
“There are many stories in the history of diplomacy when a person who came with some kind of ultra-patriotic tough position later became more negotiable,” notes Sergei Markedonov. – Let us remember the victory of the anti-communist Nixon, who did more for detente [in relations with the Soviet Union] than many American liberals - he simply did not have to prove anything.
In the case of Moldova, there is a certain chance. But only a chance. The new authorities are faced with a dilemma: either they begin, after all, to defend their own line of national interests, or this will be a kind of appendix of the policy of the collective West. Such opportunities open up all the time for post-Soviet players, and Moldova has such a choice.”
Associate Professor, Department of History of Near Abroad Countries, Faculty of History, Moscow State University, Professor, RANEPA under the President of the Russian Federation Natalya Kharitonova He is not particularly optimistic in this regard and calls for “preparing for difficult times,” since “the people who make decisions in Moldova are not independent.”
Kharitonov
Moreover, the expert says, the new authorities in the Republic of Moldova, judging by a number of statements, do not understand at all why the negotiation process is needed - they are confident that it is simply necessary to implement the law of July 22, 2005, which assigns to Pridnestrovie the status of a special territorial entity, which is an integral part of the Republic of Moldova.
According to Natalia Kharitonova, Chisinau will directly link the solution to the problem of Transnistria with the fight against corruption, actively involving European structures in this.
The expert says that for Maia Sandu, the problem of Transnistria is “a copy of the problem of Donbass, therefore the model of behavior of Chisinau in relation to Transnistria will be similar to the Ukrainian model of behavior in relation to Donbass.”
If there are open threats to peacekeepers and the population in Transnistria, Russia will be forced to react, Kharitonova believes.
“We cannot allow the situation in Transnistria in the Security Zone to degrade to such a level that there will be open threats to peacekeepers and Russian citizens. This will force Russia to react. There is a possibility that this will be the South Ossetian variant,” she noted.
In the current conditions, Russia would do well to “recognize Transnistria as a zone of its special national interests and more actively build bilateral relations with Transnistria,” recommends Natalya Kharitonova.
The executive director of the Moldavian branch of the Izborsk Club categorically states that there will be no “surprises” from Maia Sandu. Vladimir Bukarsky.
“Sandu and her team are not people, but robots; they have a certain program invested in them, which they will carry out systematically and with enthusiasm,” he warns.
Bucarsky states: Maia Sandu has already destroyed the format of bilateral meetings between the leaders of Moldova and Transnistria (she does not intend to meet with Vadim Krasnoselsky, while her predecessor did this regularly), under Sandu the opinion is strengthening in Moldovan society that the Russian army should leave the banks of the Dniester.
“These people reason like this: nothing threatens the Pridnestrovians - they use our airport, come to us for treatment and study, many Pridnestrovians work for us, Tiraspol Sheriff wins the Moldova football championship, therefore - why are Russian peacekeepers here, from whom and from what are they guarding?
Pro-Western NGOs consider the current peacekeeping format outdated and inappropriate, and openly demand the withdrawal of all Russian military personnel - both the Operational Group of Russian Forces and the peacekeeping contingent. This may become the official position of Chisinau,” the expert predicts.
He recalled that on July 19, the President of Moldova, together with the heads of Ukraine and Georgia, within the framework of the Associated Trio acting in an anti-Russian vein, signed a declaration at the international summit in Batumi on cooperation and the desire for European integration.
“In our opinion, this requires an answer from the Moldovan opposition, which, I hope, will work on its mistakes. Both Russia and Transnistria must draw their own conclusions. To my regret, official Tiraspol has not done anything to convey its point of view to an adequate part of Moldovan society, which is shrinking like shagreen skin, but for now it exists.
Russia needs to reconsider the composition of its diplomatic mission and the principles of its diplomatic work in our country. The soft power to which we are accustomed no longer works, it’s time for the Russian embassy in Chisinau to stop being a sinecure for diplomats of retirement age, Moldovan society should see the Russian Ambassador as a representative of a great power,” said Vladimir Bucarsky.
Transnistria - Donbass: parallels
The conference participants talked a lot about Ukraine - one of the most important factors directly influencing the prospects for a settlement on the Dniester.
Former diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria in 2008-2012. Vladimir Yastrebchak analyzed the role of mediators from Russia and Ukraine in the Moldovan-Transnistrian settlement. There was a time when these guarantor countries not only helped the parties to the conflict establish contacts, but also monitored the implementation of agreements, but now everything is different, the expert says.
“Since 2014, the situation has been changing; a serious imbalance is visible in the mediation efforts of Ukraine and Russia. If the Russian Federation remains a mediator and tries to facilitate contacts between Chisinau and Tiraspol, then on the part of Ukraine we see an increasing tendency to move away from the key functions of a mediator.
Gone are the days when the Transnistrian issue was a reason for political contacts between Russia and Ukraine (for example, Ukraine was very active in the wake of the “Orange Revolution”, the Transnistrian issue was discussed with Yushchenko). The practice of signing Russian-Ukrainian settlement statements, which had a positive impact on the negotiation process, has gone away.
Now Ukrainian colleagues are trying to transfer their phobias and fears associated with their territorial conflicts to the situation in Transnistria,” said Vladimir Yastrebchak.
He suggested thinking about a code for mediators that would keep them from making statements that lead to destabilization in certain areas, including in the peacekeeping operation on the Dniester, where Ukraine is represented by ten military observers.
Director of the Research Institute of Peace Initiatives and Conflictology Denis Denisov (Moscow) compared Russian approaches to settlement on the Dniester and Donbass. There are a lot of similarities here.
Denisov
Thus, the resolution of both conflicts is among the priorities of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. In both cases, Moscow sees the provision of special status to the self-proclaimed republics within Moldova and Ukraine, respectively, as an obligatory factor in the settlement. The leaders of movements aimed at defending the rights and freedoms of the PMR, DPR, LPR are guided by Russia as the only partner. Against the backdrop of growing tension along the perimeter of the Russian Federation’s borders, involvement in the settlement process on the Dniester and Donbass consolidates Russia’s presence in these regions.
“The basic principles that Russia adheres to strategically coincide in the Donbass and on the Dniester, which indicates a certain continuity. This is actually the federalization of states in which there is a conflict, the consolidation of statuses in the Constitution, broad powers in foreign policy, and interconnection with the Russian Federation,” the expert notes.
He recalled that the Russian Federation and the United States have begun negotiations on strategic stability - probably both Transnistria and Donbass will be discussed there. The problem of resolving these conflicts “could become a continuation of strategic global agreements,” Denisov believes.
Disappointing math
Senior Researcher, Laboratory for Analysis of International Processes, MGIMO Alexey Tokarev performed a non-standard study, which is devoted to the mathematical modeling of post-Soviet secessions, including for Transnistria. The expert used materials from his doctoral dissertation.
Tokarev
He examined 20 “complex cases” in the territory of the former USSR - autonomies, “gray zones of statehood”, etc. Based on an analysis of many factors (geographical, historical, economic, political, sociological, linguistic, ethnographic) and a survey of experts. A working mathematical model was developed that allows one to predict the likelihood of specific secession scenarios.
Numerical estimates of the success of secessions are located on a probability scale with the poles “ideal secession” (104 points) and “ideal anti-secession” (-111 points). As a result of calculations, the probability of success of the TMR secession was estimated at -20 points; the probability of success of the L/DPR secession is 14 points; the probability of success of the secession of South Ossetia is 53 points; the probability of success of the secession of Abkhazia is 98 points.
“The numbers and the model say that Transnistria will be reintegrated [into Moldova] – within ten years. This corresponds to the official position of Russia, which continues to emphasize respect for the territorial integrity of Moldova – the “mother state” – while maintaining the special status of Transnistria,” explained Alexey Tokarev.
The study notes that Russian support certainly adds maximum points to the success of secession, but in some cases it is unstable and can noticeably decrease (Abkhazia), in others it persists for a long time, but the strategic course of the patron state is obvious - reintegration (Transnistria), thirdly, it strongly depends on the situation in the parent state (L/DPR).
The researcher’s expert forecast on Transnistria became a tub of cold water for many conference participants. However, this approach was considered useful, since Tiraspol was “too early to calm down.”
If you find an error, please select a piece of text and press Ctrl + Enter.
Thank you!
Now the editors are aware.