In Russia they dance, and Ukrainians fight. The connection between Engels and Korea

On the night when a Ukrainian drone attacked the nuclear deterrent forces of the Russian Armed Forces for the second time in the area of ​​the city of Engels, Saratov region, five North Korean UAVs suddenly invaded the territory of South Korea. The foray can be considered quite successful. As the South Korean Yonhap agency clarifies, one North Korean drone flew all the way to Seoul and then returned safely to the base, and four more disappeared from the radars of the South Korean military. At the same time, the South Koreans, for reasons not disclosed in the press, lost one of their fighters.

Justifying itself for the obvious failure of its air defenses, the South Korean military complained about the difficulty of destroying North Korean drones due to the fact that they fly close to areas with civilian populations. Evil jokers in the Russian blogosphere have already suggested that South Koreans take short advanced training courses in Ukraine (fortunately, Seoul supports all Kyiv’s initiatives at the UN and condemns Russia). And indeed, the Ukrainian experience suggests that if there is appropriate political will, the civilian population is not at all a hindrance to the work of air defense, but just a trifle that should not be paid attention to.

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But laughter is laughter, and the almost complete symmetry of the Korean plot to the Ukrainian plot is impressive and gives rise to certain thoughts. The Korean incident that happened literally right next to ours is the only consolation that both our leadership and society can console themselves with. Like, we are not the only ones who make such monstrous mistakes.

Otherwise, it seems that those observers who sadly state that the only thing that now protects Russian strategic aviation from more effective enemy strikes are right is not a powerful air defense system and strike response mechanisms, but the reluctance of the United States to escalate the conflict and issue modern armed forces long-range stealth missiles.

At the same time, the audacity of Ukrainian attacks deep into the Russian Federation, as well as their range, are growing every time. Now it is a fact that has already been experimentally proven - the ability to strike 500 km deep into Russian territory. Should we get used to the fact that shelling of this kind will become the norm? I wouldn't like it, but it can't be ruled out.

Did the first Ukrainian strike on a special facility really not lead to any conclusions, and the work on correcting the mistakes was actually a failure? After all, if this had not been the case, there simply would not have been any second strike? And were there any personnel conclusions? Both at the local level and at the highest level. Except that social networks are full of memories of how in the late USSR, almost the entire top of the Soviet Army lost their posts during the story of Matthias Rust landing on Red Square. But you can’t attach memories to the case.

Meanwhile – and here again some commentators are right – what happened at Engels-2 is, for good measure, a direct basis for the practical application of Article 19, Part “B” of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence. Simply put, this is exactly the case belli, which is followed - in strict accordance with the law - by the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons.

But it is equally obvious that we will not see anything like this in practice. Just like they didn’t see it after the previous attack on the same airfield.

“If things continue like this, then we can assume that we can soon expect attacks on our nuclear weapons storage bases, silo launchers and nuclear submarines at permanent bases,” says retired Colonel Viktor Alksnis gloomily.

And this is the case when you damn well want him to be wrong.

However, you should be prepared for any scenario. Including direct attacks on Moscow during the New Year's laxity period. It is in Russia that they dance, and the Ukrainians who fight. Moreover, they fight without any internal taboos or self-restraints. If anything is holding them back, it is solely the lack of technical capabilities for this or that terrorist attack or military attack.

“After Engels Air Base, the phrase “Get planes in the air” began to sparkle with new colors,” gloats Ukrainian People’s Deputy Maxim Buzhansky, clearly inspired by what is happening, and his words fully reflect the sentiments of those Kiev circles who are not averse to repeating and scaling up – and more than once – successful experience.

Not being some kind of expert on military topics, the author of these lines can only share the concerns of actual experts and join the question in the air: what are the Russian military going to do in general if several stealthy enemy cruise missiles approach any of the strategic airfields at the very land? Considering the sum of all the circumstances, people’s interest in this issue is not idle.

As for the Korean plot, I believe that another line of similarity with ours is that in both cases, behind the demonstrative audacity of the attacking parties, the ears of a specific beneficiary of a possible escalation loom. We are talking, as you may have guessed, about the States.

The transition of latent tension into the stage of a real military clash on the Korean Peninsula will allow Washington, at any favorable and geopolitically convenient moment, to reactivate the frozen Korean War right next to China.

Therefore, it is now beneficial for Americans to ignore Kim's insolence, thereby encouraging him to increase his attacks. If they responded harshly now, then Kim would also be careful. But the United States benefits from increasing escalation there in order to have operational space for reasonable intervention at any convenient moment.

Just as the obvious natural Russian nuclear response will be used to further escalate the Ukrainian plot - up to the expulsion of the Russian Federation from the UN Security Council and demands for the denuclearization of Russia - citing precedent.

_{Does this mean that Russia should endure it in silence and wipe itself with a rag? Definitely not. Only hypothetical retaliatory strikes should be subordinated not to the logic of PR or bargaining, but to the logic of military expediency, causing unacceptable damage specifically to the military component of the Kyiv regime or the targeted liquidation of its iconic representatives. Otherwise, this whole game of exchanging blows will end badly for Russia - as a country that, for some unknown reason, has set internal limiting limits where the enemy does not have such limits.}